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Fighting in a Korean war: the American advisory missions from 1946-1953

Gibby, Bryan Robert

Abstract Details

2004, Doctor of Philosophy, Ohio State University, History.
In the earliest days of the Korean War, the Commander in Chief of the United States Far East Command, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur reported to President Harry Truman that South Korean troops were outmaneuvered, outgunned, and appeared beaten: “South Korean casualties as an index to fighting have not shown adequate resistance capabilities or the will to fight and our estimate is that a complete collapse is possible.” MacArthur’s low opinion of Korean soldiers rested unchallenged, and remains unchallenged to this day. American advisors in Korea were responsible for the organization, training, and development of the Korean army. Fundamental to the evaluation of the Korean army’s capability is an analysis of the American military advisory missions active in Korea from January 1946 to July 1953. This dissertation examines how these missions performed their mandated duties to organize, train, and mentor the Korean Constabulary and the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army. These advisors faced tremendous challenges ranging from cultural disconnects, inexperience, scarce resources, and lack of time. The North Korean invasion in June 1950 revealed crucial weaknesses in training, experience, leadership, and firepower. These weaknesses nearly brought the ROK Army to its knees by the spring of 1951. Once truce negotiations began, however, new command emphasis, new leadership, greater resources, and a coherent vision for reform produced a movement to create a new army that was better led, reorganized, and expanded. In the process, the Koreans developed confident leadership, trained units, and tactical and technical skills in fighting modern war. This new ROK Army fought critical battles from October 1952 through June 1953 that set the conditions for an Armistice agreement in July 1953. This study concludes that the successful reformation of the Korean Army (1951-1953) under the supervision of its American advisors enlarged the fighting ability of the Eighth United States Army as a whole. By the end of the war, Koreans were bearing a military burden that was inconceivable just two years earlier. It is improbable that an armistice agreement could have been signed without a demonstration of their increased fighting ability.
Allan Millett (Advisor)
342 p.

Recommended Citations

Citations

  • Gibby, B. R. (2004). Fighting in a Korean war: the American advisory missions from 1946-1953 [Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University]. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1086202227

    APA Style (7th edition)

  • Gibby, Bryan. Fighting in a Korean war: the American advisory missions from 1946-1953. 2004. Ohio State University, Doctoral dissertation. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center, http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1086202227.

    MLA Style (8th edition)

  • Gibby, Bryan. "Fighting in a Korean war: the American advisory missions from 1946-1953." Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University, 2004. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1086202227

    Chicago Manual of Style (17th edition)