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Nash strategies for dynamic noncooperative linear quadratic sequential games

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2006, Doctor of Philosophy, Ohio State University, Electrical Engineering.

Sequential games are those in which players apply their strategies following a certain predefined order. The sequential game is a natural framework to address some real problems, such as the "Action-Reaction-Counteraction" paradigm used in military intelligence and advertising campaigns strategies of several competing firms in economics. This dissertation focuses on stability, adaptivity and disturbance attenuation analysis of state feedback Nash strategies for a class of noncooperative dynamic Linear Quadratic Sequential Games (LQSGs).

For LQSGs with finite planning horizons, state feedback Nash strategies are provided and their existence and uniqueness within the class of state feedback strategies are proved. When the planning horizon approaches infinity, it is proved that the feedback systems with the state feedback Nash strategies are uniformly asymptotically stable, given that the associated coupled discrete-time algebraic Riccati equations (DAREs)have a positive definite solution. Moreover, it is also proved that at least one positive definite solution to the coupled DAREs of a scalar LQSG exists.

When the parameters of the objective functions are not shared among the decision makers, an on-line adaptive scheme is provided for each player to estimate the actual control gain used by the other player. The convergence to Nash strategies is proved with the condition that the associated coupled DAREs have a unique positive definite solution. The requirement of Persistency of Excitation (PE) is satisfied by two methods: reference-signal tracking and system uncertainties represented by small white noises.

The disturbance attenuation analysis of state feedback Nash strategies is based on a H-optimal control problem, which is converted into a zero-sum game. In this approach, the uncertainties are controlled by a virtual player which maximizes the cost functions that are being minimized by the real decision makers. We first derive, for finite-horizon LQSGs, state feedback Nash strategies with the optimal attenuation level √λ̂>0. We extend the approach to infinite-horizon LQSGs. A lower bound λ̂ is provided in the sense that for every λ < λ̂ the values of the LQSGs are unbounded. We also prove that the feedback system with state feedback Nash strategies is Bounded Input Bounded Output (BIBO) stable with respect to the disturbances.

Jose Cruz (Advisor)
155 p.

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Citations

  • Shen, D. (2006). Nash strategies for dynamic noncooperative linear quadratic sequential games [Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University]. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1156434869

    APA Style (7th edition)

  • Shen, Dan. Nash strategies for dynamic noncooperative linear quadratic sequential games. 2006. Ohio State University, Doctoral dissertation. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center, http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1156434869.

    MLA Style (8th edition)

  • Shen, Dan. "Nash strategies for dynamic noncooperative linear quadratic sequential games." Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University, 2006. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1156434869

    Chicago Manual of Style (17th edition)