This dissertation defends a particular account of forgiveness called the “quasi-unconditional”
view. There are two main reasons for preferring this account over the ordinary philosophical one
which, for the sake of convenience, I have called the “transactional” account. First, the
transactional account depends upon the belief that wronging others is inherently tied to how we
choose to act as moral agents, meaning that wronging others can be avoided as long as we do
what is right. Hence, under this assumption, forgiveness is called for only in the case of actions
where the doer is both responsible and blamable. This implies that the transactional account has
nothing to say on forgiveness in the case where right action can be wrongful (i.e., where
inevitable wrongdoing happens), a feature of what I have called an actual moral world. In an
actual moral world, human experience is a theatre of practical and ethical incoherence in virtue
of the difficulties we face in carrying out the multiple and yet specific roles that are
simultaneously imposed on us as members of society. Thus some form of unconditional
forgiveness is necessary simply as a way of grappling with the problematic nature of the moral
life. Quasi-unconditionality is a form of unconditional forgiveness but one that is different from
the ordinary philosophical account of unconditional forgiveness. For instance, unlike its rival, it
addresses a whole range of circumstances or wrongs for which we may not know who is
responsible, or where the issue of responsibility and/or blame is genuinely in dispute. The second
reason for preferring quasi-unconditionality is that even if we live in an ideal moral world where
it is impossible to wrong others as long as we do what is right, the transactional account cannot
address the worries that arise in cases of extreme wrongdoing. Cataclysmic evils generate
contentious concerns over the appropriateness of forgiveness. For instance, forgiveness has no
“meaning,” and there is nothing that can be done to rectify the moral scales in these kinds of
offenses. Under such cases, an approach to forgiveness is called for that depends neither on
remorse, recognition of guilt or other conditions as a basis for forgiveness, but which still sees
these things as necessary for the forgiving process to be realized. This eliminates the ordinary
philosophical account of forgiveness, implying a commitment to a form of unconditional
forgiveness of a different kind. Extreme, massive and horrific evils are like an epidemic, and
hence they pose a serious threat to the very fabric of society. In such extreme cases, the moral
situation might demand that unconditionality as a practice be treated both as an obligation and as
a “gift”. The gift introduces a new dimension into the moral life: grace. Grace renews the moral
life in the face of tragedy, extreme wronging, and injustices, but it does not erase these evils.
Like a double-edged sword, grace serves the course of justice but also makes it possible to live
in a way that transcends the walled-in moral world that we would otherwise face.