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"One to the Head, Two to the Heart": The Failure of Psychological Warfare Doctrine and Understanding in The Vietnam War

Rable, Kyle K
http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=bgsu1616336908093754

Abstract Details

2021, Master of Arts (MA), Bowling Green State University, History.
As the American presence in Vietnam grew in the early 1960s with the introduction of full combat troops in 1965, it became evident that this American War in Vietnam was not like that of World War Two or even Korea. The enemy that American service members fought in South Vietnam was a mix of a tough guerrilla force and regular North Vietnamese soldiers. They controlled the countryside and the local populations of the villages scattered in the jungles and hills. The Vietnamese guerilla tactics required that the American military attempt to pacify the rural countryside and influence guerrilla and regular soldiers to lay down their weapons. The tool to influence the enemy was the psychological operations (PSYOP) units attached to maneuver units. However, the intricacies of the requirements from MAC-V on combat commanders to produce measurable data led to an overall failure to properly use this vital asset. This thesis examines the doctrine, training, and equipment shortages of the PSYOP units in Vietnam. By examining these aspects of PSYOP while using case studies of Operation Junction City and Operation Apache Snow, this thesis suggests that the PSYOP assets on hand for combat commanders were misunderstood and misused. Arguing that the failure of the U.S. Army to provide adequate doctrine and training for its combat commanders led these commanders to equate the effort of PSYOP missions to the effectiveness of it. This narrow understanding of PSYOP damaged its chances to affect the outcome of the war adequately. This work uses Field Manuals, Standard Operating Procedures, After Action Reports, and other primary sources to examine the doctrine and use of PSYOP during the course of the war. While examining the scholarship of other authors, this work expands the current studies to add examples and analysis of PSYOP use in a setting ruled by conventional forces.
Benjamin Greene, PhD (Advisor)
Walter Grunden, PhD (Committee Member)
Alvin Beggs, PhD (Committee Member)
94 p.
American History; History; Military History; Military Studies
Psychological operations; PSYOP; Psychological Warfare; PSYWAR; Vietnam; Vietnam War; American Vietnam War; Army; counterinsurgency; Operation Junction City; Operation Apache Snow; Hamburger Hill; Westmorland; Abrams; 4th PSYOP Group; military history

Recommended Citations

Citations

  • Rable, K. K. (2021). "One to the Head, Two to the Heart": The Failure of Psychological Warfare Doctrine and Understanding in The Vietnam War [Master's thesis, Bowling Green State University]. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=bgsu1616336908093754

    APA Style (7th edition)

  • Rable, Kyle. "One to the Head, Two to the Heart": The Failure of Psychological Warfare Doctrine and Understanding in The Vietnam War. 2021. Bowling Green State University, Master's thesis. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center, http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=bgsu1616336908093754.

    MLA Style (8th edition)

  • Rable, Kyle. ""One to the Head, Two to the Heart": The Failure of Psychological Warfare Doctrine and Understanding in The Vietnam War." Master's thesis, Bowling Green State University, 2021. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=bgsu1616336908093754

    Chicago Manual of Style (17th edition)

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This open access ETD is published by Bowling Green State University and OhioLINK.