This dissertation analyzes entry components of Russia’s immigration regime, which encompasses laws, policies and actual practices (in the informal and formal realms) that regulate immigration flows, entry (immigrant access to border crossing, residence, and entry into the labor market) and incorporation (ultimately citizenship). The analysis places Russia in comparative perspective drawing on the cases of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, United Arab Emirates, and the United States.
The focus of the research is an assessment of policy inputs from society and economic actors that interact with the law and law-making processes to produce formal and informal procedures regulating immigrant populations. Russia’s immigration situation is dominated by informal processes, which arise out of conflict between economic need for migrant labor and xenophobia in society. My hypothesis is that in Russia the state manages conflicting demands from society and economy by creating restrictive control mechanisms that force migrants into the informal sector. Immigration restrictions, primarily the use of a quota system that limits the number of migrants, can be seen as populist because of their broad public appeal. Further, by pushing migrants into the informal sector, both as a result of the quota mechanism itself and the corruption involved in the implementation process, there is an ample pool of cheap (albeit illegal) labor that employers can draw on.
The dissertation proceeds to establish whether Russia fits global patterns by assessing it in comparative context. The nine other countries of immigration are considered in order to ascertain whether Russia’s use of informality is typical throughout the world. The dissertation provides evidence that, while the situation is more extreme in Russia, the presence of xenophobia and the use of informal mechanisms to manage societal and economic demands are not uncommon in countries of immigration.