In 1983 John Searle claimed that perception is intrinsically intentional. If perception is intrinsically intentional then the content of one's subjective experiences cannot be separated from the experiences themselves. It is clear that one can have an experience without attaching a specific meaning to that experience. Therefore Searle's assertion cannot be correct.
In this thesis I analyze both Searle's theory of intentionality as it relates to perception and Fred Dretske's criticisms of Searle's theory of intentionality. It is demonstrated that Dretske's initial criticisms fail. The merits of his final criticisms are discussed and used to show that intentionality is not intrinsic to perception.
I argue that experience has a derived, but subjectively immediate intentionality. In most common situations experiences appear to directly present their content due to the structure and functioning of the human mind; new or unique kinds of experience display that perception can occur without transmitting intentional content. This shows that
perception must have a derived intentionality.