The Goldwater-Nichols Act was passed in 1986 to make the American military more capable of fighting conventional wars. However, in the post-Cold War world, the United States increasingly faces unconventional threats. This study examines the effect that Goldwater-Nichols has had on U.S. Counterinsurgency capabilities, comparing thecases of Vietnam and Afghanistan. It draws on bureaucratic theory to understand how changes in institutional structure affect warfighting.
I conclude that the expanded power of the unified combatant commands and an increased focus on jointness has made the U.S. more capable of fighting insurgencies. Counterinsurgency in Vietnam suffered from a fractured chain of command and an overemphasis on offensive strategies. Afghanistan has seen a rationalization of decision-making and a greater focus on 'hearts and minds' strategies. Insufficient commitment from Washington civilian leadership, however, has deprived U.S. troops in Afghanistan of the resources they need to prevail.