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A “Psychological Offensive”: United States Public Diplomacy, Revolutionary Cuba, and the Contest for Latin American Hearts and Minds during the 1960s

Jacobs, Matthew D.

Abstract Details

2015, Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Ohio University, History (Arts and Sciences).
In January 1959 Fidel Castro took power in Cuba and soon proved to be a perplexing opponent for the United States. The island nation did not have to commit soldiers or weaponry to advance its revolutionary agenda in Latin America. The ideas and romanticism associated with the Cuban Revolution were enough to foster anti-U.S. and pro-Cuban sentiment in the region. Historian Thomas Wright wrote that the Cuban Revolution “embodied the aspirations and captured the imagination of Latin America’s masses as no other political movement had ever done.” Castro declared during the “Second Declaration of Havana” in 1962 that “it is the duty of every revolutionary to make the revolution. In America and the world, it is known that the revolution will be victorious, but it is improper revolutionary behavior to sit at one’s doorstep waiting for the corpse of imperialism to pass by.” For U.S. policymakers, confronting Castro and his revolutionary agenda became a top priority during the 1960s. Adolf Berle, a veteran U.S. foreign policymaker with experience dating back to the Franklin Roosevelt administration, headed John Kennedy’s task force on Latin America and offered the president counsel on how best to confront the growing unrest in the region. While Berle noted the positive effects that a focus on democracy, economic development, and social reform could have, he also called on the administration to launch a “psychological offensive.” In an attempt to co-opt the energies of the Cuban revolution and impede Fidel Castro’s influence in Latin America, the United States waged an extensive public diplomacy campaign against the revolutionary fervor emanating from Havana. This international history, based on research in the United States, Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba, tells the story of Washington’s attempt to discredit the Cuban Revolution, while simultaneously cultivating public opinion in Latin America during the 1960s. Central to U.S. efforts at conducting public diplomacy was the United States Information Agency (USIA). While it contained the word information in its title, that should not confuse readers. The agency engaged in both information and propaganda campaigns. Information is used to educate or to inform, while propaganda is utilized to persuade or manipulate. Throughout its existence, the USIA did both. Historian Nicholas Cull offers a good and concise definition of agency efforts as “an international actor’s attempt to manage the international environment through engagement with a foreign public.” Such actions can encompass different dimensions of U.S. government interactions with local populations, including student exchanges, publications sponsored by the United States, cultural events at U.S. binational centers, television programs, and radio broadcasts. In attempting to sway Latin American opinions of Fidel Castro, the United States could not focus solely on government to government relations; policymakers had to seek out non-state actors in the region. Washington sought to reach particular segments of Latin American society. These included intellectuals, journalists, teachers, students, and peasants. Ultimately, scholars should recognize the centrality of propaganda in U.S.-Latin American relations during the 1960s. It became an essential component of Washington’s approach, equal to, if not greater than, developmental aid and military assistance. Furthermore, this study seeks to recast how historians view post-1945 inter-American relations. A close examination of U.S. public diplomacy in Latin America during the 1960s calls into question just how historians should study the “Cold War” in the region. Local tensions, exacerbated by the Cuban Revolution, most clearly help explain the course of post-1945 U.S.-Latin American relations. In essence, the battle waged by the United States in Latin America during the 1960s, more often than not, was not tied to the larger “Global Cold War” where both U.S. and Soviet interventionism ruled the day. Rather than thinking globally, historians studying the political and social dimensions of Latin America’s long 20th century need to look locally.
Chester Pach (Committee Chair)
Kenneth Osgood (Committee Member)
Patrick Barr-Melej (Committee Member)
Kevin Mattson (Committee Member)
Brad Jokisch (Committee Member)
463 p.

Recommended Citations

Citations

  • Jacobs, M. D. (2015). A “Psychological Offensive”: United States Public Diplomacy, Revolutionary Cuba, and the Contest for Latin American Hearts and Minds during the 1960s [Doctoral dissertation, Ohio University]. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ohiou1427980665

    APA Style (7th edition)

  • Jacobs, Matthew. A “Psychological Offensive”: United States Public Diplomacy, Revolutionary Cuba, and the Contest for Latin American Hearts and Minds during the 1960s. 2015. Ohio University, Doctoral dissertation. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center, http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ohiou1427980665.

    MLA Style (8th edition)

  • Jacobs, Matthew. "A “Psychological Offensive”: United States Public Diplomacy, Revolutionary Cuba, and the Contest for Latin American Hearts and Minds during the 1960s." Doctoral dissertation, Ohio University, 2015. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ohiou1427980665

    Chicago Manual of Style (17th edition)