The second half of the twentieth century saw cyclical increases in the number of democracies worldwide as well as a rise in the number and intensity of ethnic rebellions. Some researchers link these two trends, suggesting that democratization unleashes ethnic tensions and gives rise to ethnic-based rebellion. Another proposition in the literature is that ethnic rebellion impedes democratization and may lead to democratic reversal.
This dissertation examines the conditions under which democracy and democratization affect ethnic rebellion and the conditions under which ethnic rebellion affects democratization. In examining ethnic rebellion, I employ a variety of theories: elite persuasion, political opportunity, competition, modernization, and internal colonialism theories are all tested for their utility in explaining cross-national variation in ethnic rebellion. I find that democratization is associated with future reductions in ethnic rebellion, which supports political opportunity theory. I also find an interaction between the level of development and the level of democracy in affecting ethnic rebellion. In more developed countries, the level of democracy is positively associated with rebellion. In less developed countries, the level of democracy is negatively associated with ethnic rebellion.
In examining the effect of ethnic rebellion on democracy, I find that ethnic rebellion has a negative effect on democracy and that the effect varies by the level of development a country has achieved. Among the most developed countries, the relationship is strongest, then as the level of development declines, the effect of rebellion on democracy also declines. Ethnic rebellion has the greatest negative impact on democracy in the most complex, interdependent societies.
This work also contributes to the long-standing debate over the effect of economic inequality on democracy. I find that inequality negatively affects political rights but has no effects on civil liberties.