The choice of political institutions is a critical aspect of a democratic transition. Significant amendments to the 1945 Constitution have transformed it into a more democratic framework with extensive separation of powers and checks and balances. Despite the introduction of the "difficult combination" of pure presidentialism and multipartism to Indonesia, consensual patterns of elite behavior should contribute to the further consolidation of democracy.
This study examines the impact of the first four amendments on executive-legislative relations and presidential power. The use of the 1945 Constitution by two authoritarian regimes for four decades gave rise to the perception that it inevitably created a dominant presidency. Thus Indonesian political elites set out in 1999 to curtail presidential power. Paradoxically, by the end of the process three years later they created a comparatively very powerful president, primarily due to the introduction of direct election and the narrowing of the grounds for impeachment. In addition, although the president's residual powers have been restricted, only slight reductions were made in her specific powers.
This study utilizes concepts from political economy and political psychology to analyze the struggle between two broad camps in the constituent assembly (MPR): conservatives, led by Megawati Soekarnoputri and her Indonesian Democracy Party-Struggle (PDI-P) and progressives from most of the other major political parties. The progressives consistently supported direct election, even though this did not fit with their self-interest. Their position is explained by their perceptions of Indonesia's history: in their view, the parliamentary system was the primary cause of political instability in the 1950s, and thus they concluded that pure presidentialism was more appropriate for Indonesia. Following the presidential crisis of 2001, Megawati and PDI-P reversed their initial position in opposition to direct election, as a means to strengthen the presidency and abolish the constitutional supremacy of the MPR. This reversal is explained by the "electoral bargaining approach," a theory of institutional choice developed based on cases in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and Latin America. This approach examines the interests of competing political forces rooted in their bargaining power and varying degrees of uncertainty over political outcomes.