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Rule-following and recursion: rethinking projection and normativity

Podlaskowski, Adam C.
http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1155659434

Abstract Details

2006, Doctor of Philosophy, Ohio State University, Philosophy.
This project develops the general shape for a straight solution to Kripke’s version of meaning skepticism. Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations still confounds attempts to offer a widely agreed upon solution: if Kripke is right, then there is no fact-of-the-matter regarding the rules we follow. The problem lies in saying how to make sense of a rule that guides our actions for an indefinite number of cases given that we have only finite capabilities—in short, we need to cite the fact that allows us to uniquely project to new cases on the basis of a finite number of applications. This thesis profoundly affects the prospect of devising any theory of meaning and content: if the meaning skeptic is right, then there is no fact of the matter regarding the meanings of our words or the contents of our thoughts. Figures such as Blackburn, Boghossian, Chomsky, Goldfarb, Katz, McGinn, Millikan, Pettit, and Wright have weighed in on this debate; and part of my aim is to appreciate where other proposed solutions have gone wrong, so as to avoid their errors. Within his larger dialectic, Kripke offers compelling arguments against attempts to reduce rule-following to our dispositions to act. But I agree that we must accept Kripke’s conclusion only if we accept his argument as it stands—yet I deny that we need remain happy with the original shape of the argument. I argue that we should identify competence with a rule with the dispositional analog of an intension, where operative dispositions determine the extension of a rule. On this basis, I develop the position that a recursive approach to the projectability of rules provides the initial basis for solving the skeptical problem. That is, we can make sense of acting in new cases by appeal to combinations of more basic operations. I argue that we can relocate attributions of competence around our feasible dispositions. By providing an explanation of the productive nature of rules, we can also avoid some key problems in saying how rules are normatively constraining on dispositional treatments employing normal conditions.
Neil Tennant (Advisor)
162 p.
Philosophy
rule-following; rules; indeterminacy; determinacy; Wittgenstein; Kripke; Kripkenstein

Recommended Citations

Citations

  • Podlaskowski, A. C. (2006). Rule-following and recursion: rethinking projection and normativity [Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University]. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1155659434

    APA Style (7th edition)

  • Podlaskowski, Adam. Rule-following and recursion: rethinking projection and normativity. 2006. Ohio State University, Doctoral dissertation. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center, http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1155659434.

    MLA Style (8th edition)

  • Podlaskowski, Adam. "Rule-following and recursion: rethinking projection and normativity." Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University, 2006. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1155659434

    Chicago Manual of Style (17th edition)

osu1155659434
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© 2006, all rights reserved.
This open access ETD is published by The Ohio State University and OhioLINK.