Skip to Main Content
 

Global Search Box

 
 
 
 

Files

File List


osu1164129772.pdf (727.29 KB)

ETD Abstract Container

Abstract Header

Reconstruction theories of non-ideal games

Wei, Mo
http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1164129772

Abstract Details

2006, Doctor of Philosophy, Ohio State University, Electrical Engineering.
In applications of game theory, a first step is to model the cases in the real world as precisely as possible. Currently, theories about Transferable Utility (TU) Cooperative game, Non-Transferable Utility (NTU) Cooperative game, Non-cooperative game, Zero-sum game (or constant-sum game) are applied to model various real world cases. However, there are “non-ideal” situations such as partly characterized as noncooperative games and partly characterized as cooperative games. The first case is that among the players no side payments are allowed and there are no cooperative agreements. The second non-ideal case is that among players there are side payments and agreements about sharing, but there is also risk that the sharing agreement will not be executed perfectly. The third case of non-ideal game is that among players side payments and the agreements about sharing are allowed and agreements will be executed perfectly, but the agreement itself might not be perfect. We hereby formulate game reconstruction theories that can mathematically model and analyze such “non-ideal” cases. We propose Noncooperative Coupling Game (NCCG), Sharing Creditability Game (SCG), Bottom-line Game (BLG), and some extension theories for general game situations. In the context of the new theories, we will define adversarial game, rational game, and non-rational game. NCCG and extensions of SCG and BLG can be extended to differential games. We identified corresponding existence conditions and assignment conditions of equilibrium(s). We identified the conditions with which if players care more about other players’ interests, the social payoff (the sum of the players’ payoffs) at the equilibrium, which will be divided among all the players, can be ensured to be larger. It is anticipated that the new theories can help decision makers make decisions more quantitatively, more mathematically and more precisely. The new theories will help to clarify the relationships among some popular existing game theories.
Jose Cruz (Advisor)
146 p.
game; coupling; non-ideal; sharing creditability; bottom-line

Recommended Citations

Citations

  • Wei, M. (2006). Reconstruction theories of non-ideal games [Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University]. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1164129772

    APA Style (7th edition)

  • Wei, Mo. Reconstruction theories of non-ideal games. 2006. Ohio State University, Doctoral dissertation. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center, http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1164129772.

    MLA Style (8th edition)

  • Wei, Mo. "Reconstruction theories of non-ideal games." Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University, 2006. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1164129772

    Chicago Manual of Style (17th edition)

osu1164129772
902
© 2006, all rights reserved.
This open access ETD is published by The Ohio State University and OhioLINK.