Skip to Main Content
 

Global Search Box

 
 
 
 

Files

ETD Abstract Container

Abstract Header

LIFTING THE CURSE: DISTRIBUTION AND POWER IN PETRO-STATES

Abstract Details

2008, Doctor of Philosophy, Ohio State University, Political Science.

While the empirical correlation between fuel exports and authoritarianism has become conventional wisdom, influencing academics and policy-makers, the answer for why fuel exporters tend to be more authoritarian has remained elusive. This study proposes a model based on the increased importance of government decision-making in determining the distribution of economic goods in societies that are dependent on fuel exports. These increases in government distribution, as a result of fuel development revenues primarily accruing to the state, take on three forms: direct payments and subsidization, government ownership of industry, and a more arbitrary enforcement of property rights. Countries are affected differently, dependent upon both their level of dependence and the size of revenues garnered from fuel exports. In countries with high per-capita fuel export income, fuel revenues are stabilizing for authoritarian regimes, as they provide the resources for maintaining support. In countries which are heavily dependent on fuel exports in the economy, but with a relatively low per-capita income from those exports, the increased importance of distribution in the economy results in greater instability in democratic regimes, as it increases the temptation for both government and opposition parties to lock in their share of relatively scarce resources through exclusionary politics.

Utilizing a dataset covering 166 countries from 1965 to 2001, I demonstrate that there is a general correlation between fuel export dependence and the importance of government distribution. I also find that income from fuel exports is generally stabilizing, especially for authoritarian regimes, while fuel dependence is destabilizing, especially for democracies. In addition, the same patterns of accumulation that fuel government distribution and resource competition, also promote incentives towards under-provision of public goods. This study demonstrates that fuel exporting states tend to have worse socio-economic performance than would be expected from their level of income. Finally, this study uses an in-depth case comparison of politics in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova to demonstrate the causal mechanisms, and to test the dynamics of the model. Based on these findings, policy recommendations are made for methods of distribution that produce incentives more consistent with democratic governance.

Marcus Kurtz, PhD (Committee Chair)
Timothy Frye, PhD (Committee Member)
Janet Box-Steffensmeier, PhD (Committee Member)
Richard Gunther, PhD (Committee Member)
358 p.

Recommended Citations

Citations

  • Kennedy, R. (2008). LIFTING THE CURSE: DISTRIBUTION AND POWER IN PETRO-STATES [Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University]. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1211481058

    APA Style (7th edition)

  • Kennedy, Ryan. LIFTING THE CURSE: DISTRIBUTION AND POWER IN PETRO-STATES. 2008. Ohio State University, Doctoral dissertation. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center, http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1211481058.

    MLA Style (8th edition)

  • Kennedy, Ryan. "LIFTING THE CURSE: DISTRIBUTION AND POWER IN PETRO-STATES." Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University, 2008. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1211481058

    Chicago Manual of Style (17th edition)