It is a well-known fact among those who study courts and judges that governments win cases at unusually high rates. Though this high rate of success is an established empirical fact, it is not clear why governments should fare so well. What, exactly, are the sources of the extraordinary successes of governments in litigation? What does this high level of success mean for the independence of state courts?
Utilizing the institutional variation offered by the U.S. state supreme courts, I explain state litigation success rates using the major judicial decision making theories as well as theories concerning party capabilities in litigation. I focus specifically on whether attitudinal or strategic models of decision making explain judicial behavior in state supreme courts and thus state success. In so doing, I integrate judicial decision-making and litigant capability approaches in a unified analysis of judicial decision making in the state supreme courts. I also investigate the ways in which the varying informational needs of the justices alter the litigation environment. Finally, and for the first time in the political science literature, I investigate the unique role that state solicitors play in aiding states in their litigation efforts. Specifically, I show that the solicitors are not closely analogous to the federal Solicitor General because of certain institutional deficits unique to state solicitors.