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The Alliance Market: American Security Relations Under Unipolarity

Kim, TongFi
http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1275434290

Abstract Details

2010, Doctor of Philosophy, Ohio State University, Political Science.
With the traditional notion of military alliances as a tool for aggregating power, one cannot adequately explain such phenomena as the persistence of many Cold War alliances or the formation of large numbers of alliances in the post-Cold War era, which neither involves nor is aimed against the United States. This dissertation explains these phenomena by developing a theory about the market of military alliances. I conceptualize military alliances as contracts in which states pledge a continuous exchange of goods and services, at least one of which is the provision of military force, but where the others need not be. Contrary to the capability aggregation model of alliances, states often form and maintain an alliance with another state that is unable to provide military force for allied defense. This study views the alliance market from three different angles: systemic, contractual, and domestic. First, I discuss how the structure of the alliance market, defined by systemic polarity, affects relationships between allies. With a systemic model of alliances, I argue that the vice to which great powers easily succumb in a multipolar world is overreaction; in a bipolar world, overextension; and in a unipolar world, inattention. Next, I present a chapter on the contractual aspects of alliances, explaining one of the central roles of alliance agreements—the prevention of undesirable military entanglement. After pointing out some problems with the concept of entrapment, I argue that states carefully design alliance contracts so that they prevent entrapment while not diminishing the value of alliances by preventing entanglement altogether. Following that, in the chapter on the domestic level, I explain how domestic politics affect intra-alliance bargaining and demonstrate that a state sometimes loses profits (and gains voice) as a result of increased capability. Three factors, whether there is strong domestic opposition to an alliance, whether a leader is pro-alliance, and whether a leader is vulnerable, affect how much more a state gains from its alliance relative to the minimum benefit necessary to motivate the state to be in the alliance. For statistical analysis, I use the dataset of the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions project. For case studies, I examine American alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Spain. The conclusion discusses implications of the market theory of alliances on international relations theory and policy of the United States and its allies.
Randall Schweller, PhD (Committee Chair)
Alexander Thompson, PhD (Committee Member)
Bear Braumoeller, PhD (Committee Member)
294 p.
Political Science
alliance; unipolarity; international security

Recommended Citations

Citations

  • Kim, T. (2010). The Alliance Market: American Security Relations Under Unipolarity [Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University]. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1275434290

    APA Style (7th edition)

  • Kim, TongFi. The Alliance Market: American Security Relations Under Unipolarity. 2010. Ohio State University, Doctoral dissertation. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center, http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1275434290.

    MLA Style (8th edition)

  • Kim, TongFi. "The Alliance Market: American Security Relations Under Unipolarity." Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University, 2010. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1275434290

    Chicago Manual of Style (17th edition)

osu1275434290
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This open access ETD is published by The Ohio State University and OhioLINK.