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Regulation and the Racket: Government Regulation and Transitional State Power as Catalysts for Organized Criminal Syndication

Pasternak, James M.

Abstract Details

2001, Master of Arts, Ohio State University, Slavic and East European Studies.
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 has brought the problem of Russian organized crime to the fore of public opinion, political discourse and international media representation. The comparative strength of the Soviet State, with its official low crime rates and general social order, presents a puzzle to researchers studying criminality during the transitional period. Comparatively, the former satellite nations of the Soviet Union have experienced fewer difficulties with organized crime than in the Russian Federation. Although organized crime played a greater role in the administration of black markets in the satellite nations in comparison to the Soviet Union, one would expect countries such as Poland to have a much greater propensity for the expansion of organized crime during the transitional period. The transition to a market economy was achieved with differing degrees of success in Russia and Poland; whereas in Poland, firms have had incentives to join the official economy through the benefits of state institutions protecting property rights, in Russia, predatory regulation has forced firms into the “shadow” economy. Unofficial firms have no recourse to official institutions such as legal arbitration and dispute resolution, and the need for protection from thousands of officially recognized organized gangs has created a demand for protection met by racketeers. This thesis researches the links between transitional state power, excessive bureaucratic regulation, and the growth of organized crime. Its primary focus is the expansion of organized criminal activity in the Russian Federation, but utilizes cross-country comparisons to compare and contrast differences and similarities of organized groups across an international spectrum of case studies and cross-country comparisons. Three main case studies (Russia, Sicily and the United States) will compare the growth of criminal gangs in national contexts, with one case study presented as an anomaly (Japan). Although many reasons contribute in an interrelated manner to the growth of organized crime, this thesis focuses upon aspects of state regulation and regime transition as catalysts underlying the growth of criminal gangs.
Timothy Frye (Advisor)
Daniel Collins (Committee Member)
174 p.

Recommended Citations

Citations

  • Pasternak, J. M. (2001). Regulation and the Racket: Government Regulation and Transitional State Power as Catalysts for Organized Criminal Syndication [Master's thesis, Ohio State University]. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1392654227

    APA Style (7th edition)

  • Pasternak, James. Regulation and the Racket: Government Regulation and Transitional State Power as Catalysts for Organized Criminal Syndication. 2001. Ohio State University, Master's thesis. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center, http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1392654227.

    MLA Style (8th edition)

  • Pasternak, James. "Regulation and the Racket: Government Regulation and Transitional State Power as Catalysts for Organized Criminal Syndication." Master's thesis, Ohio State University, 2001. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1392654227

    Chicago Manual of Style (17th edition)