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Decision making in the U.S. administration and the role of bureaucracy during the Berlin crisis 1961

Riller, Schanett

Abstract Details

1998, Master of Arts, Ohio State University, History.
This thesis investigates the role bureaucracy played during the Berlin crisis in 1961/62. It focuses on two aspects: first, the process of decision making in the Kennedy administration before August 13, 1961, and second, the question of policy implementation in Berlin from September 1961 to April 1962. With regard to the question of decision making, this thesis finds that Kennedy's informal governmental style and accessability for his staff provided him with a broad range of opinions on all matters concerning the Berlin problem. He established several working groups on Berlin, who discussed policy options in an open atmosphere and made valuable recommendations. In Washington, therefore, the policy making body worked smoothly and enabled the President to make carefully considered decisions. The record of the policy-implementation process, however, looks different, for implementation was not ensured. Both technical problems and personal differences between commanders in the European theater disrupted the execution of instructions from Washington. General Clay's presence in Berlin as Kennedy's Personal Representative complicated the situation further. Though Clay had no authority technically, he still initiated actions of his own. The climax of this policy was the dangerous confrontation of U.S. and Soviet tanks at the Checkpoint Charlie in the end of October. It was no longer the President who made policy in Berlin but, in fact, his Personal Representative. This present thesis as a historical case study proves that lower levels of bureaucray can and do influence both the decision and the policy making. While the decision-making machine worked relatively well throughout the Berlin crisis, the implementation of the chosen policy was not ensured. Still, Kennedy approved of Clay's actions in Berlin and made Clay's policy his own ex post facto. Paradoxically, therefore, it did not matter that the machinery for implementing policy did not function smoothly. Kennedy could have improved the functioning of the bureaucratic apparatus by providing the Berlin personnel with more authorities than he did. To keep control of as many actions and decisions as possible, however, he chose to rather take the risk of delays in policy implementation than risk a nuclear war resulting from miscalculations on lower levels of the policy making body.
Peter L. Hahn (Advisor)
Carole Fink (Committee Member)
Ahmad Sikainga (Committee Member)
131 p.

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Citations

  • Riller, S. (1998). Decision making in the U.S. administration and the role of bureaucracy during the Berlin crisis 1961 [Master's thesis, Ohio State University]. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1413459590

    APA Style (7th edition)

  • Riller, Schanett. Decision making in the U.S. administration and the role of bureaucracy during the Berlin crisis 1961. 1998. Ohio State University, Master's thesis. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center, http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1413459590.

    MLA Style (8th edition)

  • Riller, Schanett. "Decision making in the U.S. administration and the role of bureaucracy during the Berlin crisis 1961." Master's thesis, Ohio State University, 1998. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1413459590

    Chicago Manual of Style (17th edition)