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The Metaphysics of Dispositions: A Case for Counterfactualism

Blanks, David Stewart
http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1440118716

Abstract Details

2015, Doctor of Philosophy, Ohio State University, Philosophy.
A glass is fragile. It must be treated with care to prevent it from breaking. Fragility is one of many of dispositions that are part of our ordinary experience. Not only are dispositions ubiquitous in everyday life, they are also prevalent in the sciences. This is a dissertation on what dispositions are. In this dissertation I argue that counterfactualism, according to which dispositions are de re counterfactual properties (e.g., being an x such that x would break if x were struck), is superior to standard accounts of what dispositions are. Advocates of the standard views appeal to causal bases (e.g., in the case of a fragile object, the causal basis is the property of the object that would help causally bring about the object’s breaking, were it struck). According to the identity view, a disposition just is its causal basis; and, according to causal functionalism, a disposition is the property having a causal basis. Many have it that properties like dispositions should be reduced to categorical properties. Examples of simple categorical properties include being square and having three parts. It is tempting to think that causal bases have something to do with reducing dispositions. This might lead one to think that the standard views have a reductive advantage over counterfactualism. However, I argue that the standard views have no reductive advantage over counterfactualism and no other advantages either. Instead, it is counterfactualism that enjoys several advantages over the standard views, including the ability to account for baseless dispositions, better preserve the distinction between hypothetical and categorical properties, and ensure a certain kind of parsimony.
Ben Caplan (Advisor)
171 p.
Philosophy

Recommended Citations

Citations

  • Blanks, D. S. (2015). The Metaphysics of Dispositions: A Case for Counterfactualism [Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University]. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1440118716

    APA Style (7th edition)

  • Blanks, David. The Metaphysics of Dispositions: A Case for Counterfactualism. 2015. Ohio State University, Doctoral dissertation. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center, http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1440118716.

    MLA Style (8th edition)

  • Blanks, David. "The Metaphysics of Dispositions: A Case for Counterfactualism." Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University, 2015. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1440118716

    Chicago Manual of Style (17th edition)

osu1440118716
701
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This open access ETD is published by The Ohio State University and OhioLINK.