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A Feeling Theory of Feelings

Weiss, Jeremy

Abstract Details

2016, Doctor of Philosophy, Ohio State University, Philosophy.
In this dissertation I investigate positive and negative feelings, which I call `affective experiences.’ More specifically, this dissertation is an attempt to answer the following questions: what is it to feel positively or negatively about something? In what sense are positive and negative feelings positive or negative orientations towards their objects? Chapter 1 provides a bit of background and previews what is to come. In Chapter 2 I explain - and begin my defense of - my preferred answer to the questions above, one I call a `phenomenal attitude view.’ Such a view claims, roughly, that what makes positive feelings positive is a similarity in how the attitudes in which they consist feel, and what makes negative feelings negative is a similarity in how the attitudes in which they consist feel. Although affective experiences are diverse in a number of ways, there is phenomenological unity behind that diversity. Then, in Chapters 3 and 4, I consider the most plausible alternative answers to the questions above. In Chapter 3 I assess `evaluative content views,’ which have it, roughly, that what makes positive feelings positive is that they represent things as good in some way, and what makes negative feelings negative is that they represent things as bad in some way. In Chapter 4 I assess `motivational attitude views,’ which have it, roughly, that what makes positive feelings positive is that they dispose us to act positively towards what they are about and what makes negative feelings negative is that they dispose us to act negatively towards what they are about. I argue that neither alternative works: they are each either extensionally inadequate or they give the wrong kind of accounts of the sense in which affective experiences are positive or negative orientations towards what they are about (or both). Further, I try to show that the best arguments for these alternatives are not particularly good. In Chapter 5, I argue that even if these alternatives join forces, so to speak, they are still inadequate. I argue for this claim by showing that feeling is necessary for love, and that motivation and evaluation (even together) are not sufficient - unless they come with feeling. But not only do we learn here that evaluative content views and motivational attitude views are implausible: we also learn that affective experiences as such are very important. That justifies us in paying closer attention to feelings as such (instead of bulkier things like emotions, desires, etc., perhaps). Finally, in Section 6, I conclude by pointing out some ways in which the discussions and arguments of this dissertation bear on a number of philosophical debates, and I make some tentative suggestions about promising areas for future research on these topics. The discussions and arguments of this dissertation promise, in some small way, to further our understanding of the nature of consciousness, intentionality, desire, moral judgment, practical reason, and lives worth living.
Sigrún Svavarsdóttir (Advisor)
Justin D'Arms (Committee Member)
Declan Smithies (Committee Member)
209 p.

Recommended Citations

Citations

  • Weiss, J. (2016). A Feeling Theory of Feelings [Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University]. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1462182103

    APA Style (7th edition)

  • Weiss, Jeremy. A Feeling Theory of Feelings. 2016. Ohio State University, Doctoral dissertation. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center, http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1462182103.

    MLA Style (8th edition)

  • Weiss, Jeremy. "A Feeling Theory of Feelings." Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University, 2016. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1462182103

    Chicago Manual of Style (17th edition)