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Dogmatism About Action Forecasts

Hurst, John
http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1471478710

Abstract Details

2016, Doctor of Philosophy, Ohio State University, Philosophy.
This dissertation is an investigation of the relationship between having an intention to do something and having the belief that you will do it, a belief I call an “action forecast”. Paradigmatically, when we intend to do something, we also we believe that we will do it. Moreover, this belief seems to be formed immediately, not on the basis of observation or inference. This gives rise to a number of questions. What are intentions? Do intentions entail action forecasts? On what basis, if any, are action forecasts epistemically justified? After a bit of background and some previewing of coming attractions in chapter one, in chapter two I consider whether intentions necessarily entail action forecasts. I start with the universally accepted claim that intention settles the matter of what to do and examine what this amounts to. I argue that the settling role of intention supports the view that intention is a sui generis conative attitude and that it is false that necessarily, if one intends to E, then one believes that one will E. In chapter three, I consider an underexplored strategy for preserving a necessary connection between intentions and action forecasts. Here I consider whether it is possible to rationally intend to E without believing that you will E. I argue the answer to this question is “yes” and that appearances to the contrary are misleading, an artifact of the ways in which we plan, the various rational pressures our intentions are subject to, and the fact that intending to E justifies believing that you will E. In chapter four, I consider the question: what justifies an action forecast? I survey two general schools of thought about the relationship between intentions and action forecasts and the competing pressures that have pushed philosophers towards each view: the cognitivist view according to which intention is, inter alia, a belief that one will E and the inferentialist view according to which action forecasts are justified by evidence of one’s intention plus additional evidence concerning the reliability or efficacy of one’s intention. After presenting, developing, and criticizing the cognitivist and inferentialist views, I propose and defend a neglected answer to this question: the dogmatist view according to which action forecasts are non-inferentially or immediately justified by our intentions. I argue that intention is as plausible as anything else to be a candidate for immediate justification and argue that the dogmatist view can accommodate the competing pressures that have pushed philosophers towards cognitivism and inferentialism. Accordingly, the relationship between intentions and action forecasts is this: necessarily, if one is fully rational, and one intends to E, and one considers the question whether one will E, and one has no defeaters for the belief that one will E, then one believes that one will E. In chapter five, I point out some ways in which the discussions and arguments of this dissertation bear on a number of philosophical debates, including how they shift the burdens that cognitivists and inferentialists incur going forward, and make some suggestions about promising areas for future research.
Abraham Roth (Advisor)
Tristram McPherson (Committee Member)
Declan Smithies (Committee Member)
186 p.
Philosophy
Dogmatism, Action Forecasts, intentions

Recommended Citations

Citations

  • Hurst, J. (2016). Dogmatism About Action Forecasts [Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University]. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1471478710

    APA Style (7th edition)

  • Hurst, John. Dogmatism About Action Forecasts. 2016. Ohio State University, Doctoral dissertation. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center, http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1471478710.

    MLA Style (8th edition)

  • Hurst, John. "Dogmatism About Action Forecasts." Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University, 2016. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1471478710

    Chicago Manual of Style (17th edition)

osu1471478710
159
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This open access ETD is published by The Ohio State University and OhioLINK.