I propose and defend a fully-relative nonconsequentialist normative moral theory, MATRC (pronounced, may-trick), that I argue is able to stave off both paradox and triviality, something several initially plausible versions of nonconsequentialism have failed to do. On my view, Constraints are both Agent and Time Relative. For example, while I certainly have moral reason to prevent you from killing innocent people, I am constrained from killing an innocent person in service of those reasons. Moreover, I am constrained from infringing a constraint now, just to prevent some future constraint infringement. So, on my view, there are moral constraints in virtue of which I, myself, cannot, at the present moment, permissibly perform certain actions, such as killing innocent persons, even if doing so would maximize the good. But, I argue that these constraints are moderate, rather than absolute (the “M” in MATRC). Absolute views maintain that constraint infringements are morally impermissible in all cases. However, I argue that in certain cases, such as to save a million people, constraint infringements are permissible.
In order to pave the way for MATRC, I begin by dispelling the charge of triviality, which comes from what has been dubbed the “Consequentializing Project”. This is the view that all normative moral theories can be “turned into” act consequentialist views. Accordingly, a surgeon is prohibited from harvesting the organs of an innocent person to save five others not due to a constraint, but rather because saving the five results in a worse world relative to the surgeon. I argue that even if we can consequentialize, we ought not to insofar as the complications that arise when consequentializing ultimately negate the theoretical benefits, and indeed, result in a number of theoretical costs.
The charge of paradox traditionally comes from the so-called Paradox of Deontology. It seems whatever motivation a moral theorist has for adhering to constraints, we should be permitted to harm individuals when it would prevent a higher number of similar harms. A second challenge, I argue, comes from a hitherto underappreciated paradox, what I dub the intra-personal paradox of deontology. In these cases, an agent is faced with infringing a single constraint in order to minimize her own constraint infringements. After rejecting the view that the agent may perform such an infringement, I show how MATRC’s agent- and time-relativity both exemplifies the underlying motivations for constraints while successfully responding to both the inter- and intra-personal paradoxes of deontology.
Finally, turning to the moderate nature of constraints, I work to show that moderate constraints are both coherent and justified. I argue that while respect for persons requires that agents not perform certain actions, one must also acknowledge those that may benefit from a constraint infringement. This acknowledgement provides the motivation for thresholds. Once a threshold has been met, however, I argue that an agent must continue to show respect for the rights holder through certain moral emotions. With moderate deontology understood, I turn to the question of where these thresholds might be, and develop a novel framework.