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Market Mechanisms For the Deep Integration of Renewable Energy

Dakhil, Balsam
http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1562316287366083

Abstract Details

2019, Doctor of Philosophy, Ohio State University, Electrical and Computer Engineering.
In this dissertation, we study some problems concerning the integration of renewable energy. First, we design and analyze a two-stage mechanism for selling a stochastic resource where penalties are paid at the second stage to compensate for shortfalls in the amounts contracted in the first stage. We consider a setting in which a renewable generator, whose generation is a random variable with some probability distribution, is selling its generation to a number of flexible buyers through a two-stage electricity market. The system operator runs an auction in which the seller bids its probability distribution and the buyers submit their valuation functions. The system operator inputs these bids to a stochastic program to decide on an efficient allocation that maximizes social welfare, and then uses Myerson's payment to price electricity. The closed-form solution we obtain for the allocation and payment rules of our mechanism allows us to analyze the mechanism and prove its incentive compatibility in dominant strategies, individual rationality, and budget balancedness. We also investigate the sensitivity of the mechanism to the seller’s manipulation of its distribution. We show through running some simulations that increasing the number of buyers in the system reduces the gains the seller obtains from manipulation. In this work, we also analyze the effects of limited ramping capacity on the price of electricity. We study the problem of dynamic economic dispatch with ramping constraints and stochastic demand, which can ramp up or ramp down significantly due to the presence renewable generation. In conclusion, we show the value of investing in ramping capacity and highlight the possibility of exercising market powers by generators monopolizing it. Our study of the evolution of prices in this setting leads to the understanding that limited ramping of some generators enhances the market power of the flexible ones.
Abhishek Gupta (Advisor)
Kevin Passino (Committee Member)
Andrea Serrani (Committee Member)
101 p.
Electrical Engineering
renewable energy; electricity market; stochastic programming; auctions; electricity prices; flexibility; ramping; market power

Recommended Citations

Citations

  • Dakhil, B. (2019). Market Mechanisms For the Deep Integration of Renewable Energy [Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University]. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1562316287366083

    APA Style (7th edition)

  • Dakhil, Balsam. Market Mechanisms For the Deep Integration of Renewable Energy. 2019. Ohio State University, Doctoral dissertation. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center, http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1562316287366083.

    MLA Style (8th edition)

  • Dakhil, Balsam. "Market Mechanisms For the Deep Integration of Renewable Energy." Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University, 2019. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1562316287366083

    Chicago Manual of Style (17th edition)

osu1562316287366083
238
© 2019, all rights reserved.
This open access ETD is published by The Ohio State University and OhioLINK.