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Watchdogs that do not Bite, Nets that do not Catch, and "Perps" Policing Themselves: Why Anti-Corruption Multi-Level Governance Efforts Fail in the Philippines.

Yllana, Grace R.
http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1380613168

Abstract Details

2013, PhD, University of Cincinnati, Arts and Sciences: Political Science.
The transnational nature of grand corruption in developing countries, and its resistance to the onslaught of Anti-Corruption Multi-Level Governance (ACMLG) efforts over the past two decades, has been an increasing source of concern for the international community. More disturbing is why, despite vast resources devoted to such efforts, have corruption levels not gone down, particularly in the Philippines, a country celebrated for its return to democracy with the advent of the People Power Revolution that ousted the Marcos dictatorship. The hypothesis that ACMLG does not lower levels of corruption is tested by comparing and contrasting one country, the Philippines with five other countries of similar background to see what may account for similarity or differences in ACMLG outcomes. Quantitative and qualitative analyses are used in comparing the presence and activities of AC MLG such as international and national legal frameworks, government programs and agencies, and civil society participation to corruption indices reported by Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, World Bank World Governance Indicator for Control of Corruption, Global Financial Integrity's Flow of Illicit Funds Index, Global Integrity Scorecard corruption score and the Bertelsmann Transformation Index. In addition, Philippine economic, social, and political correlates of corruption are compared and contrasted with select countries. This research finds the economy and not politics or culture, to be the biggest predictor of corruption. Differences in elite behavior are also a predictor of corruption and area for more research. This answers in part why intensive political institution building has not produced the intended results in the short term. Moreover, this research found that ACMLG efforts did not factor in the reality of state capture by predatory elites in developing countries. It lacks logic to expect the main beneficiaries of corruption to themselves take action against their own interest. This research contributes to the body of knowledge by mapping and correlating relevant ACMLG efforts with measured levels of corruption to answer the question of whether or not and why such efforts have failed. The gaps in the body of knowledge in current anti-corruption strategies unearthed by this research brought forth new solutions. For example, the use of US qui tam laws, also known as Lincoln's law, enabling private citizens to have standing in filing suit on behalf of the state, may help curb corruption in developing countries. Since this research found the core problem to be the unlikelihood of having the most powerful and corrupt to file suit against themselves, qui tam laws can potentially be the solution to this fundamental problem. Adam Smith's and James Madison's "greed to counter greed" formulation inspires this research's idea of "bounty hunters" tracking and recovering illicit wealth, cost being the biggest reason for failure. This research prescribes pre-emptive actions by reallocating resources from information and self evaluation strategies to successful litigations by shifting the burden of responsibility to multinationals, banks and financial institutions in first world countries, which are often the harbingers of and havens for stolen wealth. Also prescribed is an economic thrust to ACMLG efforts, such as debt forgiveness and restructurings as overlooked prescriptions and possibly the most effective anti-corruption initiatives.
Laura Jenkins, Ph.D. (Committee Chair)
Stephen Mockabee, Ph.D. (Committee Member)
Thomas Moore, Ph.D. (Committee Member)
584 p.
Political Science
Corruption; Multi-Level Governance; Philippines; Qui Tam Laws; Predatory State; UNCAC OECD Anti-Bribery Convention

Recommended Citations

Citations

  • Yllana, G. R. (2013). Watchdogs that do not Bite, Nets that do not Catch, and "Perps" Policing Themselves: Why Anti-Corruption Multi-Level Governance Efforts Fail in the Philippines. [Doctoral dissertation, University of Cincinnati]. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1380613168

    APA Style (7th edition)

  • Yllana, Grace. Watchdogs that do not Bite, Nets that do not Catch, and "Perps" Policing Themselves: Why Anti-Corruption Multi-Level Governance Efforts Fail in the Philippines. 2013. University of Cincinnati, Doctoral dissertation. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center, http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1380613168.

    MLA Style (8th edition)

  • Yllana, Grace. "Watchdogs that do not Bite, Nets that do not Catch, and "Perps" Policing Themselves: Why Anti-Corruption Multi-Level Governance Efforts Fail in the Philippines." Doctoral dissertation, University of Cincinnati, 2013. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1380613168

    Chicago Manual of Style (17th edition)

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This open access ETD is published by University of Cincinnati and OhioLINK.