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The Limits of Moral Demandingness

Stepanenko, Walter S
http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0839-1782
http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1560867899540477

Abstract Details

2019, PhD, University of Cincinnati, Arts and Sciences: Philosophy.
Some moral theories are extremely demanding; they ask a lot of moral agents. However, giving an account of what is wrong with extreme moral demands and how it is possible to legitimately reject extreme moral demands is difficult. Call the problem of identifying, explaining, and justifying limits on moral requirement the problem of moral demandingness. In this dissertation, I argue that this problem can be best solved through an examination of the critical literature on Act Utilitarianism, the paradigmatic example of an extremely demanding moral theory. I argue that objections to Act Utilitarianism fall into four classes, that Act Utilitarianism is extremely demanding because it is alienating, confining, unfair, and because it compromises the well-being of agents. I then examine several other extreme demands emerging from sources other than Act Utilitarianism, such as the extreme demands that can emerge from special relations, from the demands of non-maleficence, and from the demands of cooperation. I argue that the four objections to Act Utilitarianism are equally applicable to other extreme demands, and I suggest that this means our informed reactions to extreme moral demands are more coherent and more explicable than is sometimes appreciated. I contend that the four classes of objections to extreme moral demands can be transformed into general limits of moral demandingness. For example, if the reason an agent has for behaving a particular way would treat that agent unfairly, then, that agent cannot be morally required to behave that way. If an agent were to comply with the unfair demand, they may be doing something heroic, or supererogatory, but they are not doing anything morally requisite. So, when the reason an agent has for complying with a moral demand runs afoul of a limit of moral demandingness, I argue, it is transformed from a reason that grounds an obligation into one that counts merely as a consideration in favor of supererogatory action. I contend that a view which recognizes my proposed limits of moral demandingness can make moderate, but compelling moral demands in difficult contemporary moral crises, such as climate change and global poverty. I also argue that a view which recognizes my proposed limits of moral demandingness can give a compelling account of just how much slack an agent should pick up when other agents fail morally and that such a view could therefore make reasonable demands in a range of conditions from full to partial compliance. Finally, I argue that extreme moral demands all involve distortions of agential capacity: they undermine or strain personal development and personal relationships. I argue that agents can justifiably rejects extreme moral demands because agents have a legitimate interest in personal development and personal relationships and pursuit of these interests is consistent with significant concern for others.
Vanessa Carbonell, Ph.D. (Committee Chair)
Lawrence Jost, Ph.D. (Committee Member)
Heidi Maibom, Ph.D. (Committee Member)
177 p.
Philosophy
ethics; morality; demandingness; limits

Recommended Citations

Citations

  • Stepanenko, W. S. (2019). The Limits of Moral Demandingness [Doctoral dissertation, University of Cincinnati]. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1560867899540477

    APA Style (7th edition)

  • Stepanenko, Walter. The Limits of Moral Demandingness. 2019. University of Cincinnati, Doctoral dissertation. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center, http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1560867899540477.

    MLA Style (8th edition)

  • Stepanenko, Walter. "The Limits of Moral Demandingness." Doctoral dissertation, University of Cincinnati, 2019. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1560867899540477

    Chicago Manual of Style (17th edition)

ucin1560867899540477
684
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This open access ETD is published by University of Cincinnati and OhioLINK.