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Bio-Inspired Hardware Security Defenses: A CRISPR-Cas-Based Approach for Detecting Trojans in FPGA Systems

Abstract Details

2019, MS, University of Cincinnati, Engineering and Applied Science: Electrical Engineering.
Hardware security has attracted a great deal of attention in recent years as more attack vectors are identified and uncovered, and the cat and mouse game is likely to continue as new vulnerabilities are exploited and creative solutions are implemented. With a globalizing semiconductor supply chain, the threat of Trojans in hardware will continue to grow causing much concern regarding the trustworthiness of hardware and IP. Cost savings drive many decisions in this sphere, and these lower prices often come at the expense of trust in the security of the product. The detection of Trojans in hardware systems is of paramount importance for ensuring a system with confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Trojans cannot be removed or tolerated if they remain undetected. Many different mechanisms have been proposed for hardware Trojan detection in FPGA devices. Some of these detection methods focus on test-time detection; others focus on detection prior to implementation while others utilize run-time detection. The first two methods provide valid ways of detecting some Trojans; however, Trojans are often specifically designed to avoid detection at test-time or before implementation making run-time detection a more attractive option. Run-time detection entails monitoring the FPGA for signs of Trojan activity, but this can be realized in a number of ways, and no system currently exists which can detect all types of hardware Trojans. Many parallels can be drawn between hardware or software development and natural evolution which has seen a progression from single-celled organisms to complex organisms like Homo sapiens. One example of these parallels is an analogy between hardware or software attacks and biological attacks. This work proposes a bio-inspired adaptation of the CRISPR-Cas mechanism of some prokaryotes for use in a Trojan detection system. First the CRISPR-Cas mechanism is introduced as a microorganism defense and adaptation system and the motivation for understanding it is covered. Next, this mechanism is simulated to understand the flow of genetic information through a biological system, and the results are discussed in the context of biological organisms. The knowledge and understanding gained through this simulation are used to propose a novel run-time Trojan detection method titled CADEFT which is inspired by the biological CRISPR-Cas mechanism. Various implementations of a CRISPR-Cas-based Trojan detection mechanism are considered at different levels of FPGA design. The CADEFT system is proposed for realization at the bitstream level to monitor the configuration bitstream and the run-time properties of the FPGA device. The flexibility of the CADEFT system comes from the CRISPR-Cas mechanism’s ability to recognize similar patterns which may not have been previously encountered but may still pose a threat to the system. Lastly, future work is considered including the combination of multiple Trojan defense systems like detection and tolerancing systems. Run-time detection and removal of Trojans is highly desirable due to the wide range of critical systems which are deployed on FPGAs and may be difficult or costly to remove from operation.
Rashmi Jha, Ph.D. (Committee Chair)
David Kapp, Ph.D. (Committee Member)
Anca Ralescu, Ph.D. (Committee Member)
87 p.

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Citations

  • Staub, D. (2019). Bio-Inspired Hardware Security Defenses: A CRISPR-Cas-Based Approach for Detecting Trojans in FPGA Systems [Master's thesis, University of Cincinnati]. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1563872470616901

    APA Style (7th edition)

  • Staub, Dillon. Bio-Inspired Hardware Security Defenses: A CRISPR-Cas-Based Approach for Detecting Trojans in FPGA Systems. 2019. University of Cincinnati, Master's thesis. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center, http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1563872470616901.

    MLA Style (8th edition)

  • Staub, Dillon. "Bio-Inspired Hardware Security Defenses: A CRISPR-Cas-Based Approach for Detecting Trojans in FPGA Systems." Master's thesis, University of Cincinnati, 2019. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1563872470616901

    Chicago Manual of Style (17th edition)