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Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: A Last Ditch Effort to Turn Around a Failing War

McCullough, Benjamin P.
http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wright1406041482

Abstract Details

2014, Master of Arts (MA), Wright State University, International and Comparative Politics.
As the United States moved closer to ending its military involvement in Afghanistan by the end of 2014, intense debate on the relevance and success of the United States' counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy in the country continues. Many observers have been quick to declare the strategy a failure without fully analyzing the critical components of COIN doctrine that are necessary for a campaign to succeed, and the extent to which those components were in place in Afghanistan. This study examines the case of Afghanistan by determining whether the U.S.’s counterinsurgency strategy was successful in achieving the four main objectives identified by FM 3-24 as necessary for COIN’s success. This study also looks at whether or not the United States’ COIN strategy was successful in generating and maintaining the public support needed to carry out a prolonged counterinsurgency operation. By utilizing a mix of deductive logic based on contemporary COIN theory and currently available scholarly resources, government documents, and U.S. and ISAF military field reports, this study seeks to answer whether the counterinsurgency strategy devised by Generals David Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal was successful in achieving the four main objectives needed for the success of this strategy in Afghanistan.
Pramod Kantha, Ph.D (Committee Chair)
Vaughn Shannon, Ph.D (Committee Member)
Donna Schlagheck, Ph.D (Committee Member)
251 p.
Comparative; International Relations; Military Studies; Political Science
Counterinsurgency, Insurgency, Terrorism, Afghanistan, Taliban, FM 3-24, Petraeus, McChrystal, Afghan Government, Afghan National Security Forces

Recommended Citations

Citations

  • McCullough, B. P. (2014). Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: A Last Ditch Effort to Turn Around a Failing War [Master's thesis, Wright State University]. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wright1406041482

    APA Style (7th edition)

  • McCullough, Benjamin. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: A Last Ditch Effort to Turn Around a Failing War. 2014. Wright State University, Master's thesis. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center, http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wright1406041482.

    MLA Style (8th edition)

  • McCullough, Benjamin. "Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: A Last Ditch Effort to Turn Around a Failing War." Master's thesis, Wright State University, 2014. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wright1406041482

    Chicago Manual of Style (17th edition)

wright1406041482
3,793
© 2014, some rights reserved.Creative Commons License Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: A Last Ditch Effort to Turn Around a Failing War by Benjamin P. McCullough is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License. Based on a work at etd.ohiolink.edu.
This open access ETD is published by Wright State University and OhioLINK.