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Thesis_Second_Revised.pdf (29.8 MB)
ETD Abstract Container
Abstract Header
An Engage or Retreat differential game with Mobile Agents
Author Info
Chandrasekar, Swathi
ORCID® Identifier
http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2348-4808
Permalink:
http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wright1503716818890551
Abstract Details
Year and Degree
2017, Master of Science in Electrical Engineering (MSEE), Wright State University, Electrical Engineering.
Abstract
The thesis is aimed at developing optimal defensive strategies that dissuade an attacker from engaging a defender while simultaneously persuading the attacker to retreat. A two-player Engage or Retreat differential game is developed in which one player represents a mobile attacker and the other player represents a mobile defender. Both players are modeled as massless particles moving with constant velocity. The choice to terminate the game in engagement or retreat lies with the attacker. The defender indirectly influences the choice of the attacker by manipulating the latter's utility function. In other words, the defender co-operates with the attacker so that retreat appears to be the best option available. The solution to the differential game is obtained by solving two related optimization problems namely the Game Of Engagement and Optimal Constrained Retreat. In the Game of Engagement, the attacker terminates the game by capturing the defender.In the Optimal Constrained Retreat, a value function constraint is imposed which deters the attacker's retreat trajectory from entering into a region where it may lead to engagement. Such regions where constrained retreat occurs are known as escort regions. The solutions to these two problems are used to construct the global equilibrium solutions to the Engage or Retreat differential game.The global equilibrium solution divides the admissible state space into two regions that contain qualitatively different equilibrium control strategies. Numerical solutions are included to support the theory presented.
Committee
Zachariah E. Fuchs, Ph.D. (Advisor)
Luther Palmer, Ph.D. (Committee Member)
Xiadong (Frank) Zhang, Ph.D. (Committee Member)
Pages
89 p.
Subject Headings
Electrical Engineering
Keywords
Differential game theory
;
Optimal control
;
Game theory
;
Nash equilibrium
;
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Citations
Chandrasekar, S. (2017).
An Engage or Retreat differential game with Mobile Agents
[Master's thesis, Wright State University]. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wright1503716818890551
APA Style (7th edition)
Chandrasekar, Swathi.
An Engage or Retreat differential game with Mobile Agents.
2017. Wright State University, Master's thesis.
OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center
, http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wright1503716818890551.
MLA Style (8th edition)
Chandrasekar, Swathi. "An Engage or Retreat differential game with Mobile Agents." Master's thesis, Wright State University, 2017. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wright1503716818890551
Chicago Manual of Style (17th edition)
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Document number:
wright1503716818890551
Download Count:
296
Copyright Info
© 2017, all rights reserved.
This open access ETD is published by Wright State University and OhioLINK.