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Abraham Lincoln, Contract Disputes, and Remedying Legal Inefficiencies

Fox, Savannah
http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wuhonors1469104099

Abstract Details

2015, Bachelor of Arts, Wittenberg University, Economics.
The objective of this project is to combine the preceding research in the fields of the Coase theorem, game theory, contract law, and the history of Abraham Lincoln to expose the intentions of his career as an attorney. Through this sample of Lincoln’s contract cases found on the Second Edition of the Law Practice of Abraham Lincoln database, it becomes clear that the legal system is associated with high transactions costs. The high cost of taking a case to trial can, and should be, avoided through bargaining and out of court settlements. It is important to use Lincoln as the center of this research because his cases show signs of an economist’s perspective. There are, of course, cases that highlight the economic inefficiency associated with trials, but there are also cases in which Lincoln, as the attorney, employs techniques consistent with cooperative game theory that lower these transaction costs in a way that would follow the Coase theorem. Because Coase’s original theory is representative of a fictional world with no transaction costs, I argue that a normative application of the Coase theorem, through the practice of specific performance as a remedy, can be employed to identify ways the legal system can be changed to reduce transaction costs. Lincoln once wrote in his notes for a lecture, “Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever you can. Point out to them how the nominal winner is often a real loser---in fees, expenses, and waste of time. As a peacemaker the lawyer has a superior opportunity of being a good man. There will still be business enough.” This paper will prove Lincoln’s intentions to limit transaction costs by applying contemporary economic theories to this historic account.
David Wishart, Dr. (Advisor)
James Allan, Dr. (Committee Member)
Fred Tiffany, Dr. (Committee Member)
46 p.
Economics; History
game theory, economics, history, Abraham Lincoln

Recommended Citations

Citations

  • Fox, S. (2015). Abraham Lincoln, Contract Disputes, and Remedying Legal Inefficiencies [Undergraduate thesis, Wittenberg University]. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wuhonors1469104099

    APA Style (7th edition)

  • Fox, Savannah. Abraham Lincoln, Contract Disputes, and Remedying Legal Inefficiencies. 2015. Wittenberg University, Undergraduate thesis. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center, http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wuhonors1469104099.

    MLA Style (8th edition)

  • Fox, Savannah. "Abraham Lincoln, Contract Disputes, and Remedying Legal Inefficiencies." Undergraduate thesis, Wittenberg University, 2015. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wuhonors1469104099

    Chicago Manual of Style (17th edition)

wuhonors1469104099
546
© 2015, all rights reserved.
This open access ETD is published by Wittenberg University Honors Theses and OhioLINK.
Release 3.2.12