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Modeling Monitoring of An Industry In A Game-Theorectic Framework with Imperfect Information

Abstract Details

2015, Master of Science, University of Akron, Applied Mathematics.
We model the interaction of a regulator monitoring an industry as an extensive- game with imperfect information, i.e., the players in the game make their moves in a sequential manner and are not aware of the other players’ previous actions when it is their turn. We use a published model that allows for both a regulator and a firm to help control pollution, and modify it by adding a choice for the regulator to monitor the industry or not. We show that as the probability that firms in an industry provide optional controls of pollution increases, the acceptable level of monitoring is non-increasing for a fixed cost of monitoring.
Stefan Forcey, Dr. (Advisor)
Francesco Renna, Dr. (Advisor)
Curtis Clemons, Dr. (Committee Member)
46 p.

Recommended Citations

Citations

  • Johnson, J. D. (2015). Modeling Monitoring of An Industry In A Game-Theorectic Framework with Imperfect Information [Master's thesis, University of Akron]. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=akron1431097174

    APA Style (7th edition)

  • Johnson, Joseph. Modeling Monitoring of An Industry In A Game-Theorectic Framework with Imperfect Information. 2015. University of Akron, Master's thesis. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center, http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=akron1431097174.

    MLA Style (8th edition)

  • Johnson, Joseph. "Modeling Monitoring of An Industry In A Game-Theorectic Framework with Imperfect Information." Master's thesis, University of Akron, 2015. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=akron1431097174

    Chicago Manual of Style (17th edition)