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Prospective Reappointment and the Monetary Policy Preferences of the Federal Open Market Committee Members

Kotenko, Diana G.
http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1246273422

Abstract Details

2009, MA, Kent State University, College of Business and Entrepreneurship, Ambassador Crawford / Department of Economics.
The main purpose of the research is to investigate the behavioral of the Governors and Bank Presidents at the meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). We have a hypothesis that the Bank presidents and Governors behave differently. We suppose that the governors of the FOMC which are completing a term of another governor and are eligible for reappointment change their behavior as there is a short amount of time prior the reappointment. This correlation has a big effect on the decision making at all meetings as very few of the governors serve for their full term; as a full term is 14 years, there is a high turnover among the governors at FOMC. Therefore, the time left to the reappointment of each governor may be causing a bigger impact on the decision making than the monetary policy. This research is contributing to the political economy literature in the area of Federal Reserve Bank of the United States of America. We have a unique data set as we do not use a dissent voting data. Even though dissent data sets are available for a much longer periods of time, they lose much of the relevant information. The motivation for our research is the fact that all of the governors of the Federal Open Market committee are appointed by the President of the U. S. and in this way he can reach the policies in which he is interested.
Michael Ellis, PhD (Advisor)
Eric Johnson, PhD (Committee Member)
Dandan Liu, PhD (Committee Member)
94 p.
Economics
Federal Reserve Bank; Federal Reserve System; Board of Governors; Federal Reserve Bank Presidents; Federal Funds Rate; Taylor Rule; Great Moderation; Power of Appointment; President; Political Economy

Recommended Citations

Citations

  • Kotenko, D. G. (2009). Prospective Reappointment and the Monetary Policy Preferences of the Federal Open Market Committee Members [Master's thesis, Kent State University]. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1246273422

    APA Style (7th edition)

  • Kotenko, Diana. Prospective Reappointment and the Monetary Policy Preferences of the Federal Open Market Committee Members. 2009. Kent State University, Master's thesis. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center, http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1246273422.

    MLA Style (8th edition)

  • Kotenko, Diana. "Prospective Reappointment and the Monetary Policy Preferences of the Federal Open Market Committee Members." Master's thesis, Kent State University, 2009. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1246273422

    Chicago Manual of Style (17th edition)

kent1246273422
354
© 2009, all rights reserved.
This open access ETD is published by Kent State University and OhioLINK.