This dissertation studies the 1994 U.S. intervention in Haiti, focusing on causation (why did Bill Clinton decide to intervene in Haiti?) and consequences (what did the United States and the United Nations achieve from 1994 to 2001?).
Regarding U.S. motives, the dissertation argues that economics and ideology played secondary roles in convincing the Clinton administration to intervene in Haiti. Restoring U.S. and presidential credibility; stopping the flow of Haitian refugees; securing the political support of the Congressional Black Caucus; and responding to demands by Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide were the decisive factors. Regarding consequences, the dissertation views the U.S./U.N. occupation as a political and economic failure. U.S. occupation forces, particularly during the first few months following the 1994 intervention, limited themselves to basic law and order, often with the help of former Haitian soldiers. Political strife soon resumed. A politically divided Haitian government refused to approve economic reforms requested by foreign donors and thus failed to seize this opportunity to better the economic lot of most Haitians.
Sources for the dissertation are: World Bank, IMF, UN, OAS, U.S., and Haitian internal government documents; documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act; interviews with participants; published government documents; U.S., Haitian, French, Canadian, and Venezuelan newspapers and magazines; and secondary literature.