The Realist paradigm minimizes or excludes altogether regime attributes as a weighty and enduring factor in the international behavior of nations. However, research on the behavior of democracies, in particular, has strongly suggested that some regime attributes exert a great of influence over a states behavior, particularly its propensity to become involved in militarized interstate disputes. One specific result of this line of research is that democracies do not war against other democracies, or rarely do. Regime strength, the ability to hold on to political power, was of interest to political scientists in the recent past, but research in this area has lapsed. This research is intended to explore the role of regime strength in explaining state behavior, and, especially a states propensity to engage in armed interstate conflicts. To this end, this research investigates the following hypothesis: Weak regimes are more conflict prone than strong regimes, because weak regimes use, among other policies, armed conflict with other states to attempt to ameliorate their political weakness. Five case studies are used to assess the evidence of a connection between regime weakness and the propensity to engage in armed interstate conflict. This is for two reasons. First, it is important to capture the way the leader and regime thought about politically weakness, why, what it contemplated as a remedy, and why. Second, all the cases (and I suspect most, though not all, weak regimes), are autocratic. The indicators of regime weakness in such societies are likely to be subtle, internal to the regimes leadership circle. There are no data bases available adequate for this purpose. This hypothesis, regime weakness is associated with an elevated propensity to engage in armed interstate conflict, is supported strongly by the case studies. The results have implications for political science research and U.S. strategic policy. First, the next step is to explore the comparative weights of regime weight and regime type using, as much as possible, the data and methodology of the existing DPprop literature. This line of inquiry is to be designed to reveal whether some of the behavior currently attributed to regime type, and democracy specifically, might actually be better attributed to regime strength. Second, U.S. national security strategy, especially the contribution of deterrence to it, is currently linked to a regime attribute, regime type. Specifically, the U.S. seeks to spread democracy in the belief that democratic regimes tend to act in ways consistent with U.S. interests. If regime strength is also a strong influence on state behavior, then U.S. strategy ought to concern itself also with spreading strong regimes. If regime weakness is associated with a propensity for engaging in armed interstate conflicts, then national security strategy must reflect that. The Realist paradigm minimizes or excludes altogether regime attributes as a weighty and enduring factor in the international behavior of nations. However, research on the behavior of democracies, in particular, has strongly suggested that some regime attributes exert a great of influence over a states behavior, particularly its propensity to become involved in militarized interstate disputes. One specific result of this line of research is that democracies do not war against other democracies, or rarely do. Regime strength, the ability to hold on to political power, was of interest to political scientists in the recent past, but research in this area has lapsed. This research is intended to explore the role of regime strength in explaining state behavior, and, especially a states propensity to engage in armed interstate conflicts. To this end, this research investigates the following hypothesis: Weak regimes are more conflict prone than strong regimes, because weak regimes use, among other policies, armed conflict with other states to attempt to ameliorate their political weakness. Five case studies are used to assess the evidence of a connection between regime weakness and the propensity to engage in armed interstate conflict. This is for two reasons. First, it is important to capture the way the leader and regime thought about politically weakness, why, what it contemplated as a remedy, and why. Second, all the cases (and I suspect most, though not all, weak regimes), are autocratic. The indicators of regime weakness in such societies are likely to be subtle, internal to the regimes leadership circle. There are no data bases available adequate for this purpose. This hypothesis, regime weakness is associated with an elevated propensity to engage in armed interstate conflict, is supported strongly by the case studies. The results have implications for political science research and U.S. strategic policy. First, the next step is to explore the comparative weights of regime weight and regime type using, as much as possible, the data and methodology of the existing DPprop literature. This line of inquiry is to be designed to reveal whether some of the behavior currently attributed to regime type, and democracy specifically, might actually be better attributed to regime strength. Second, U.S. national security strategy, especially the contribution of deterrence to it, is currently linked to a regime attribute, regime type. Specifically, the U.S. seeks to spread democracy in the belief that democratic regimes tend to act in ways consistent with U.S. interests. If regime strength is also a strong influence on state behavior, then U.S. strategy ought to concern itself also with spreading strong regimes. If regime weakness is associated with a propensity for engaging in armed interstate conflicts, then national security strategy must reflect that.