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On Kant, Arpaly and Practical Rationality

Choi, Andrew N.

Abstract Details

2010, Doctor of Philosophy, Ohio State University, Philosophy.
In my dissertation, I develop and defend a new version of the Kantian theory of action and practical rationality. According to the Kantian theory of action, action is behavior that is genuinely guided by a series of representations which reflect the agent's understanding of what he is doing – namely, judgments about reasons for action, best judgments and choices. Moreover, one significant claim of the Kantian theory of practical rationality is the claim that rational action is action that accords with one's best judgment, and irrational action is action that goes against one's best judgment - where acting in accordance with one's best judgment is taken to be a necessary (and not sufficient) condition of rational action, whereas acting against one's best judgment is taken to be a sufficient condition of irrational action. While these claims are taken for granted by Kantians, they have recently come under significant fire. In a well-known paper, Nomy Arpaly presents a character named “Sam”, an agent who allegedly acts rationally even though he acts against his best judgment. In light of Sam, Arpaly concludes that we should reject the aforementioned claim of the Kantian theory of practical rationality. Now, while Arpaly’s main target is the Kantian theory of practical rationality, the argument has repercussions for the Kantian theory of action as well. As it happens, the Kantian theory of action makes a further claim that makes accommodating the case of Sam quite difficult - it claims that the agency in action is manifested in the role that conscious representations play in action. In light of the problems associated with this claim, Arpaly suggests that we dispense with the Kantian project in its entirety. In contrast with Arpaly, I am less pessimistic about the Kantian enterprise. I develop a theory of action and practical rationality that coopts much of the Kantian framework, but revises the Kantian claim about agency in action. Specifically, I claim that unconscious representations can be manifestations of agency in action, albeit in a limited set of cases. In light of the revision, the new theory easily accommodates the case of Sam. In fact, it shows that Sam is an agent who acts rationally and acts in accordance with his best judgment. The result is a theory that gives the Kantian a new alternative, one that resists Arpaly’s push to dispense with the Kantian framework. Furthermore, it preserves a central tenet that Kantians and many others hold dear – that rational action is action that accords with one’s best judgment, and irrational action is action that goes against one’s best judgment.
Timothy Schroeder, PhD (Committee Chair)
Sigrún Svavarsdóttir, PhD (Committee Member)
Piers Norris Turner, PhD (Committee Member)
174 p.

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Citations

  • Choi, A. N. (2010). On Kant, Arpaly and Practical Rationality [Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University]. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1291140287

    APA Style (7th edition)

  • Choi, Andrew. On Kant, Arpaly and Practical Rationality. 2010. Ohio State University, Doctoral dissertation. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center, http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1291140287.

    MLA Style (8th edition)

  • Choi, Andrew. "On Kant, Arpaly and Practical Rationality." Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University, 2010. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1291140287

    Chicago Manual of Style (17th edition)