As American military historians ponder the impacts of military intelligence operations on the conduct and outcome of the nation's wars, a key question comes to mind: how can we most objectively assess America's performance of military intelligence operations? In answering this question we must understand the complexity of military intelligence work, for it traverses that gray area where military strategy and foreign policy intertwine. Oftentimes, when policymakers and military leaders fail to synchronize American foreign policy objectives and military strategy, the intelligence community, which forms a bridge between the political and military realms, makes a convenient scapegoat for such policy failures. Conversely, intelligence successes most often remain highly classified to protect the collection capabilities that facilitated a corresponding operational success. Much better known for its failures than its successes, military intelligence is widely regarded as the quintessential oxymoron.
Yet, worse contradictions in terms have affected the American conduct of war. For example, in the Korean War the American principle of "do more with less." proved true for all parts of the United States Armed Forces in the Far East, including their military intelligence organizations. In the midst of a post World War II force reduction, military intelligence, performed the best that it could within prescribed geopolitical and military constraints. Moreover, the war catalyzed the chaotic reorganization of the U.S. national security structure, which had tremendous impact on military intelligence operations in Korea.
It is in this context that we must reassess American military intelligence operations in the Korean War. For over a half-century, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and his Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G-2), Major General Charles A. Willoughby, have borne the brunt of blame for the "intelligence failures" of June 25th and November 25th, 1950. These "failures" are drastically oversimplified. They ignore important distinctions between discerning enemy capabilities and order of battle and the harder task of discerning enemy intentions. In reassessing intelligence operations in the Korean War, one finds that "intelligence failures" were actually military, strategic, and political policy failures that became mutually reinforcing. MacArthur and Willoughby should not bear their burden alone.