The role of international organizations (IOs) in world politics has evolved from one primarily consumed by facilitating cooperation between states to one that includes providing public goods and services within states. In this latter role, IOs are mandated to build domestic capacity in developing countries. Today’s IOs train police, scientists, and teachers, build health clinics, administer vaccines, disarm combatants, and design irrigation systems, roads, and constitutions, to name but a few among countless tasks. The persistence of severe economic inequality across states suggests that the IO role in solving domestic incapacity problems is likely to continue despite the fact that the record of IO performance can only be described as mixed. What factors explain IO performance in solving domestic incapacity problems (DIPs)?
Previous studies emphasize the importance of conditions on the ground in recipient countries in explaining IO performance. I argue that the IO response to domestic incapacity problems is inhibited not only by factors on the ground but also by the interests and incentives of both IO staff and the member states that serve as the primary financiers of IO activities. I develop a theoretical framework to explain when member state donors and IO staff will put their best foot forward in attempting to solve domestic incapacity problems and draw attention to the importance of the tenuous relationship between IO staff and their wealthiest member states.
Efforts to solve DIPs intend to produce benefits for recipient states, not donors. This makes support contingent on donors holding political interests that complement the cause. When support is withheld, it not only hurts performance, but it also damages IO interests. Due to their reliance on donor states, IOs have incentives to prioritize activities that appeal to donors. As a result, IO staff might simultaneously be faithful agents to their donor states, but fail to fulfill mandates to solve domestic incapacity problems. Importantly, however, the likelihood that IO staff will respond to these incentives depends on actors inside the IO. I break from common treatments to treat the IO bureaucracy as a plural, rather than unitary, actor. Competing interests among departments and offices can inhibit a coherent organizational response to donor state incentives and have interesting effects on performance.
The performance of the World Health Organization’s in building health systems capacity in developing countries between 1980 and 2010 provides a first test of the theory. The case demonstrates how easily donor states’ political interests can intervene to prevent support for DIP activities and illustrates the complexity and influence of IO bureaucracy; conflict between WHO offices inhibited performance early on and reforms to alleviate conflict improved performance. The climate change activities of the Global Environmental Facility provide a second testing ground. A comparison between donor state support for mitigation and adaptation activities confirms donor states’ preference for IO projects that produce global benefits. Competition between three GEF implementing agencies—the World Bank, UNDP and UNEP—serves both to motivate their involvement and prevent collaboration, producing mixed effects on performance.