This study explores the phenomenon of executive – legislative relations in a new multiparty presidential system. It seeks to understand why, contrary to arguments regarding the dysfunctionality of multi-party presidential systems, Indonesia’s governmental system appears to work reasonably well.
Using institutionalism as the main body of theory, in this study I argue that the combination of formal and informal institutions that structure the relationship between the president and the legislature offsets the potential of deadlock and makes the relationship work. The existence of a coalition-minded president, coupled with the tendency to accommodative and consensual behavior on the part of political elites, also contributes to the positive outcome.
This study joins the latest studies on multiparty presidentialism in the last two decades, particularly in Latin America, which argue that this type of presidential system can be a successful form of governance. It contributes to several parts of the debate on presidential system scholarship. First, by deploying Weaver and Rockman’s concept of the three tiers of governmental institutions, this study points to the importance of looking more comprehensively at not only the basic institutional design of presidentialism (such as dual legitimacy and rigidity), but also the institutions below the regime level which usually regulate directly the daily practice of legislative – executive relations such as the legislative organizations and the decision making process of the legislature.
Second, related to the first contribution, this study points to the importance of not only focusing our attention on the separation of the legislative and executive branches (such as dual legitimacy) but also on the level of legislative – executive integration.
Third, this study has also used a coalitional presidentialism approach in building its argument. Its focus however, is not only on the success of the president’s agenda as the measure of success, but also, on the formal and informal institutions as constraints which influence how the president and the legislature interact with each other.
Finally, given that studies of multiparty presidentialism outside Latin America are still rare, this study contributes to enlargement of the data set of multiparty presidential systems in the world.