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Transactive Control for Large-Scale Cyber-Physical Systems

Li, Sen
http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1511397616555155

Abstract Details

2017, Doctor of Philosophy, Ohio State University, Electrical and Computer Engineering.
This thesis focuses on large-scale transactive control systems, where a coordinator employs economic principles and tools to manage a large-scale cyber-physical system (CPS) to achieve group objectives. Typical examples of CPS include residential loads, autonomous vehicles, robots, among others. The coordination problem involves hierarchy of decision making, which arises from the co-existence of a coordinator and the self-interested agents with different agenda. In such problems, each agent attempts to maximize the individual utility in the lower layer, while the coordinator aims to achieve a system-level objective in the upper layer. The hierarchical nature of the problem poses significant challenges in the design and computation of optimal coordination strategies. In this thesis, we provide a brief survey for a few important classes of transactive control systems, and study the following three cases in detail: First, we consider a coordination problem for a group of thermostatically controlled loads (TCL) motivated by the Pacific Northwestern Demonstration Project. A market-based coordination framework is proposed. By assuming that each agent is a price taker, the optimal bidding and clearing strategy is obtained. It maximizes social welfare subject to the feeder capacity constraint. The second problem is multi-stage pricing for a large population of TCLs without the price taker assumption. The problem is formulated as a reverse Stackelberg game that involves a mean-field game in the lower level. The optimal solution is derived by connecting it to a team problem, and we show that this solution maximizes the social welfare. The third result significantly generalizes the second result by considering a mean-field game in vector spaces. We show that although the mean-field game is not a potential game, under some mild conditions the $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium of the mean-field game coincides with the optimal solution to a social welfare optimization problem. This connection enables to evaluate the efficiency of the mean-field equilibrium, and leads to several important implications on the existence, uniqueness, and computation of the mean-field equilibrium.
Wei Zhang (Advisor)
Andrea Serrani (Committee Member)
Abhishek Gupta (Committee Member)
122 p.
Electrical Engineering
transactive control, mean-field game, market-based coordination

Recommended Citations

Citations

  • Li, S. (2017). Transactive Control for Large-Scale Cyber-Physical Systems [Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University]. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1511397616555155

    APA Style (7th edition)

  • Li, Sen. Transactive Control for Large-Scale Cyber-Physical Systems. 2017. Ohio State University, Doctoral dissertation. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center, http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1511397616555155.

    MLA Style (8th edition)

  • Li, Sen. "Transactive Control for Large-Scale Cyber-Physical Systems." Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University, 2017. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1511397616555155

    Chicago Manual of Style (17th edition)

osu1511397616555155
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© 2017, all rights reserved.
This open access ETD is published by The Ohio State University and OhioLINK.