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Essays on Financial Intermediation and Monetary Policy

Setayesh Valipour, Abolfazl
http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1650043278420555

Abstract Details

2022, Doctor of Philosophy, Ohio State University, Economics.
My research revolves around financial institutions. In this essay, I aim to further our understandings of the internal workings of financial intermediaries, how they interact in financial networks, and how they affect monetary policy and the macroeconomy. In the first chapter, James Peck and I study a bank run model where the depositors can choose how much to deposit. In the many years and many published articles following the bank runs paper of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), only a few papers have modeled the decision of whether to deposit, much less the decision of how much to deposit. The questions we address here are, how does the opportunity for consumers to invest outside the banking system- in investments that do not provide liquidity insurance- (1) affect the nature of the final allocation, (2) affect the nature of the optimal deposit contract, and (3) affect the fragility of the banking system? We extend the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model so to incorporate sequential service constraint and the opportunity of outside investments and show that under certain conditions the equilibrium entails partial deposits, thus arguing for the optimality of limited banking. One might think that when depositors are allowed to invest a fraction of their endowments outside the banking system, they would be hedging against the risk of a run occurring, but losing out on some of the services provided by banks. Thus, one might think that this would improve the stability of the financial system at the expense of lost efficiency. However, we show that the opposite could be true, with reduced stability (runs more likely) but higher efficiency! In the second chapter, I study the strategic behavior of heterogeneous banks in a network and its implications on the stability of the financial system. I construct a model alas Allen and Gale (2000) wherein banks differ in whether they are hit by an uninsurable excess liquidity demand. I show that in such a framework banks that are already facing a high liquidity demand are more likely to incur the burden of excess liquidity shocks even when that shock has not directly hit them, i.e. relatively healthier banks strategically pass liquidation costs to relatively less healthy banks. I also show that private bailouts arise endogenously in this framework. If the strategic behavior of a bank results in the other bank's failure, the first bank may choose to incur the burden of the liquidity shock by itself to let the other bank survive and, thus, to control the indirect costs of failure feeding back to its portfolio. I also show that for some economies the financial network becomes more stable as the level of cross-deposits is increased from the minimum level that fully insures banks against liquidity demand uncertainty up to a threshold level. In the third chapter, I study the role of financial intermediaries in the transmission of monetary policy in low interest rate environments. The global financial crisis not only proved our understanding of intermediaries were inaccurate and in many ways misleading but also provided an unprecedented opportunity to investigate the questions in ways that were not possible before. Among those, was the behavior of economic players in ultra-low and even negative market rates. I study the internal workings of intermediaries by exploiting geographical variation in market concentration and provide the first explanation for the gradual deterioration of monetary policy power in low market rates that does not rely on bank-specific characteristics and similarly applies to non-bank intermediaries. I show that- in stark contrast to the textbook view but consistent with my mechanism- in low market rates more concentrated banks respond to market rate falls by reducing their deposit supply as well as their loan supply by more than those of less concentrated banks. I argue this behavior is the response of banks to loan and deposit demand becoming less elastic to market rate changes in low market rates which itself is due to the shift of household assets from the ones that are fully responsive to market rate changes (e.g. money market funds) to those less responsive (e.g. deposits) or irresponsive (e.g. cash) in low market rates. As the market rate falls, The downward pressure of the increased market power and the upward pressure of the traditional channels, cause the non-monotonic response of banks to market rate changes. The results help explain the puzzling slow recovery of the economy as well as stable inflation after the global financial crisis. I also show that local house prices become less responsive to market rate changes in low market rates in the counties that are exposed to high-market-power banks.
James Peck (Advisor)
Sanjay Chugh (Committee Member)
Kyle Dempsey (Committee Member)
136 p.
Banking; Economic Theory; Economics; Finance
Bank Runs, Financial Networks, Fragility, Contagion, Private Bailouts, Banking, Market Power, Concentration, Shadow Bank, Slow Recovery, Reversal Interest Rate, Zero Lower Bound, ZLB, ELB, Regulation, Global Financial Crisis, COVID

Recommended Citations

Citations

  • Setayesh Valipour, A. (2022). Essays on Financial Intermediation and Monetary Policy [Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University]. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1650043278420555

    APA Style (7th edition)

  • Setayesh Valipour, Abolfazl. Essays on Financial Intermediation and Monetary Policy. 2022. Ohio State University, Doctoral dissertation. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center, http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1650043278420555.

    MLA Style (8th edition)

  • Setayesh Valipour, Abolfazl. "Essays on Financial Intermediation and Monetary Policy." Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University, 2022. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1650043278420555

    Chicago Manual of Style (17th edition)

osu1650043278420555
517
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